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Abstract
A system is described that uses a mixed-level represen-
tation of (part of) the meaning of natural language docu-
ments (based on standard Horn Clause Logic) and a
variable-depth search strategy that distinguishes between
the different levels of abstraction in the knowledge
representation to locate specific passages in the docu-
ments. Mixed-level representations as well as variable-
depth search strategies are applicable in fields outside
that of NLP.
1.  Outline
Most knowledge representation schemes used in AI
(and, in particular, in Natural Language Processing) are
homogeneous. One application that makes obvious the
limitations of a homogeneous representation space is fact
retrieval from natural language texts. Our understanding
of the semantics of natural language is still so incomplete
that the representation of the content of natural language
texts must either remain fragmentary, or allow for
expressions of varying degrees of abstractness to occur in
the same representation scheme. We present, in the con-
text of passage retrieval, a mixed-level representation
scheme based on standard Horn Clause Logic and outline
a variable-depth evaluation strategy to be used over this
type of representation. The combination of such a multi-
level representation and a search strategy that is sensitive
to the resulting variability in granularity is of general
interest for the design of knowledge representation
schemes.
2.  The Problem
The amount of textual information available today in
machine-readable form makes it increasingly difficult to
locate relevant information reliably and efficiently. With
the number of machine readable documents accessible in
contemporary data bases or over the networks going into
the millions, even the best search systems based on
traditional Information Retrieval (IR) methods
overwhelm the user, in many cases, with thousands of
documents. It would be extremely useful to have text
based fact retrieval systems or, even more ambitiously,
text based question answering systems. However, model-
ing the deep understanding of unrestricted text needed
for these applications is still beyond our technical capa-
bilites. This is why we are developing, as an intermediate
solution, a system that is capable of taking us to the exact
place in a natural language text that is relevant to a query
(i.e. a passage retrieval system).
Work on this paradigm has just begun, mainly by
researchers in the field of IR ([1 ]). However, it is doubt-
ful that IR methods will be very useful in this new con-
text due to their lack of precision. One of the reasons for
this lack lies in the fact that these systems ignore almost
all the linguistically relevant information in documents
beyond the bare lexical skeleton. Thus both of the ques-
tions
1) ?- Logic for natural language analysis
2) ?- Languages for the analysis of natural logic
would be converted, under a keyword-based approach,
into a query
?- logic & natural & language & analysis
and hence return the same documents although the origi-
nal queries are far from synonymous. By ignoring func-
tion words, morphology, and word order, the keyword
extraction procedure loses all the syntactic structure in
the natural language input, and consequently all the
semantic information that is encoded in natural language
through syntax becomes unavailable. Any amount of sta-
tistical sophistication applied to the bare keywords will
not be able to recover the information that was thrown
away when extracting the keywords. This effect makes
itself felt particularly clearly when one tries to use stan-
dard IR techniques to the goal of passage retrieval.
The goal of this paper is to show how a combination of
well known techniques from Natural Language Process-
ing (NLP) and AI, together with the less widespread tech-
niques of mixed-level knowledge representation and
variable-depth evaluation strategies, can overcome, in
part, the performance related problems that would other-
wise mar a fully-fledged NLP based passage retrieval
system.
3.  The use of linguistic information in Infor-
mation Retrieval so far
Most of the IR systems described in the literature that
make use of linguistic information at all fall into the
category of syntax driven automatic indexing. In such
systems, syntax structures are merely used to derive
phrase descriptors, i.e. multi-term descriptors which are
then used in the standard way. However, retrieval results
are not significantly better than with standard approaches
([2 ]). Some systems now use the syntactic structures
themselves as descriptors. In such systems, the syntax
structure of a query will have to match the syntax struc-
ture of some expressions in a candidate documents
directly, i.e. without the intermediary step of phrase
descriptors (e.g. [3 ], [4 ]).
However, if we use full syntax structures as descrip-
tors, we run into the problem that there will almost never
be an exact match between the syntax structure of query
and (parts of the) documents. First, the same state of
affairs can almost always be described in a variety of
ways and, in particular, widely different syntactic struc-
tures can be used to express the same meaning. For a
direct syntax matching approach this has the conse-
quence that we can not even hope to find an immediate
match between the syntax structure of the query and the
syntax structure of (part of) a candidate document.
Second, queries normally denote supersets of what the
relevant documents denote. If our query is ‘‘program-
ming languages’’ we want to retrieve (among others) all
the documents about ‘‘object-oriented programming
languages’’. Again, the syntax structures of the query and
of the expressions making up the documents will be
different, and we need some kind of syntactic correlate of
the semantic superset/subset relation.
4.  Using logic as search and index language
An alternative solution that was implemented in a pro-
totype passage retrieval system, LogDoc, starts from the
idea that the problem underlying syntactic variability is
really a mismatch between a syntactic structure and a
semantic expression: Although their syntactic realisa-
tions are different, the meanings of two phrases may be
the same, and it is this relationship that we are ultimately
interested in. The basic idea of LogDoc is, thus, to use
logic, with a simple ontology, as a knowledge representa-
tion language. We translate documents into logical
axioms with back-pointers to the source text, add the
axioms to an incrementally growing logical data base,
translate queries into theorems, and by proving the latter
over the former we are able to retrieve the original docu-
ments answering the query. - Key to the success of this
procedure is the fact that we can express in logic certain
complex relationships between word senses that we can-
not represent with standard IR representation schemes. If
we use First Order Logic as representation language a
document fragment like 3
3) A structure sharing representation of language
for unification based grammar formalisms
might, for instance, become
3a) representation(R,L) ∧ language(L) ∧ share(R,S)
∧ structure(S,Y) ∧ goal(F,R) ∧ formalism(F,G) ∧
grammar(G,Z) ∧ unification(U) ∧ base(F,U)
Note that a large number of nouns in English and related
languages are of the relational type, i.e. they denote rela-
tionships. One standard way to represent them in logic is
by means of predicates of the appropriate arity, i.e. the
same way we will normally represent verbs. Thus two-
place predicates like representation(R,L),
formalism(F,G) etc. express the facts that we are talk-
ing about the representation of languages, formalisms for
grammars etc. Note that none of these relations can be
represented by the standard IR operators (such as ‘adja-
cent’ etc.) since one of the properties of natural language
is that the distance between functionally linked words
can (often) be arbitrarily long.
The expression 3a is, however, not a logical sentence,
i.e. it has no truth value and cannot, as such, be treated as
an axiom. But in a retrieval context it is justifiable to say
that, whatever is referred to by means of a full noun
phrase, is asserted to exist. We can therefore translate
everything that is explicitly referred to in a text by means
of a full noun phrase into an existentially quantified state-
ment, i.e. we can apply ‘‘existential closure’’ to formulae
like 3a and get:
3b) ∃ R,L,S,Y,F,G,Z,U:
representation(R,L) ∧ language(L) ∧ share(R,S) ∧
structure(S,Y) ∧ goal(F,R) ∧ formalism(F,G) ∧
grammar(G,Z) ∧ unification(U) ∧ base(F,U)
In order to have back-pointers to the original documents
we add, to each individual axiom, document number and,
for passage retrieval, fragment (i.e. sentence, title, or
caption) number as additional non-logical constants. If
we use a subset of First Order Logic for which efficient
proof procedures are known, such as Horn Clause Logic,
we will get
3c) representation(sk-1,sk-2)/1/3, language(sk-2)/1/3,
share(sk-1,sk-3)/1/3, structure(sk-3,sk-4)/1/3,
goal(sk-5,sk-1)/1/3, formalism(sk-5,sk-6)/1/3,
grammar(sk-6,sk-7)/1/3, unification(sk-8)/1/3,
base(sk-5,sk-8)/1/3.
meaning that these axioms were all derived from frag-
ment number 1 in document number 3. Passage retrieval
can now be interpreted as proving queries over the logi-
cal data base derived from the documents. If we apply a
standard proof technique like refutation resolution, a
query must be translated into the clausal form of its nega-
tion, and
4) ?- Structure sharing representations of languages
would then become
4a)?- representation(R,L)/S/D, language(L)/S/D,
share(R,S)/S/D, structure(S,Y)/S/D.
Note, first, that this query means that we want to prove
the theorem over axioms that were all derived from the
same sentence in the same document. Note also that the
case where a query is more specific than a relevant docu-
ment (the normal case) is taken care of automatically by
this proof procedure, i.e. theorem 4a can be proved
directly over the axiom system 3c.
5.  The choice of a suitable ontology
One point that previous approaches to the problem of
formalising the semantics of natural language have paid
insufficient attention to is that of the ontology, or concep-
tualisation. The question of what kind of objects, and
what kind of relationships between these objects, we
assume to exist in the world has a direct bearing on the
model to use, and therefore on the definition of the
language. The first problem to address is that of
representing relationships in logic. There are two basic
approaches to this: The ‘‘ordered argument’’ approach,
and the ‘‘thematic role’’ approach (cf. [5 ]:84ff.]). The
ordered argument approach assumes that there exists a
finite number of roles that objects can play in relation-
ships. These roles are implicitly encoded by means of the
fixed argument positions of predicates. A sentence like
5) John gave Mary an apple
might thus be represented as
5a)gave(john,sk-1,mary). apple(sk-1).
This is the approach taken in all the examples so far.
However, there are many more roles expressed in natural
language than those used so far, and for all of them we
need to create additional argument positions. Take exam-
ple
6) On Tuesday, John furtively gave Mary an apple
in the courtyard
where we express information about the circumstances of
the event, viz. about the time, the location and the
manner in which the action was performed. We would
thus have to extend the predicate pattern by additional
argument positions and write
7) give(john,sk-1,mary,tuesday1,courtyard1,furtive).
apple(sk-1).
In natural language, there is a rich set of other cir-
cumstantial modifiers, for the cause and/or for the reason
of an event (‘...because he loves her’), for the
goal/purpose (‘‘in order to impress her’’), or even for
highly complex roles such as a concessive circumstance
(‘... although he was told not to’). It seems entirely
unclear how many such roles ought to be expressed.
There is growing consensus that it is not even a finite set.
Since the ordered argument model seems to fail to
account for these empirical facts of language the alterna-
tive account, the thematic role account, has gained much
popularity. This approach assumes a potentially infinite
set of event roles. They are explicitly encoded as predi-
cate names. The corresponding predicates range over one
object each, and the event itself. What was an n-place
predicate under the ordered argument account thus
becomes a set of n+1 two-place predicates. 6 would yield
a logical representation like
7a) eventuality(give,sk-5). time(tuesday1,sk-5).
agent(john,sk-5). location(courtyard1,sk-5).
aff_ent(sk-1,sk-5). manner(furtive,sk-5).
goal(mary,sk-5). object(sk-1,apple).
where the Skolem constant sk-5 denotes the eventuality
(the term ‘‘eventuality’’ subsumes actions, events, and
states). If additional information concerning other event
roles becomes available, the set of predicate names is
monotonically extended (reason, concessive etc.),
that is, we need never commit ourselves to a fixed set of
roles.
It is sometimes assumed that a commitment for one of
these two approaches is a matter of technical conveni-
ence. It is worth pointing out that this is not the case.
Consider, for instance, the case of action modification
(expressed mainly through manner adverbials): By
translating 6 as 7 we implicitly assert, by the very act of
creating argument positions for time and place, that these
attributes are equally fundamental to a goal-directed
action as are agent, affected entity, and goal. In particu-
lar, by creating an argument position we are forced,
under the Horn Clause Logic model assumed here, to
specify that the corresponding variable is either univer-
sally or existentially quantified. We cannot leave its
quantificational status unspecified. However, in natural
language we seem to allow unspecified attributive values.
While utterance 8 is syntactically well-formed (no time
and place is specified), 9 is not (no affected entity is
specified):
8) John gives Mary apples
9) * John gave Mary on Tuesday in the courtyard
It can thus be seen that agent, affected entity, and goal
are obligatory roles while time and place are not. Note
that generic sentences like 8 do not quantify over points
in time or locations, not even implicitly (e.g. by assuming
default values). Utterance 8 asserts that it is one of John’s
habits to give Mary apples, without any indication of
place or time. In particular, utterance 8 is neither
synonymous with ‘‘For any given point in time, John will
be seen giving Mary apples’’ nor with ‘‘For some point in
time...’’. Since the interpretation for the clausal represen-
tation enforces, under resolution refutation, a binding for
each argument value of a predicate (either referential,
existential or universal), we could not represent 8 under
the ordered argument scheme without an unwarranted
commitment to the values of attributes like ‘‘place’’ and
‘‘time’’ (and any other attributes encoded as argument
positions).
Under the thematic role scheme (axiom system 7a
above), on the other hand, we treat all attributes as
equally peripheral and dispensable. We could perfectly
well drop the roles for agent, affected entity and goal
without the resulting set of axioms becoming incoherent.
However, any rendering of it in natural language would
result in an ill-formed utterance, such as 9. Moreover, the
vital distinction between obligatory and optional infor-
mation is not made, either. We believe that this shows
that neither of the representation schemes can be used in
pure form.
There are a number of syntactic reasons that convince
us that an intermediate position must be found. Most sub-
stantial among them is the basic syntactic distinction
between complements, which are obligatory (at least in
declarative main sentences; cf. [6 ]:481) and adjuncts,
which are optional. More specifically, we argue that the
former correspond to the semantic category of partici-
pants in eventualities, and the latter to circumstances.
The most appropriate way to map such constituents into a
logical representation is therefore to use fixed argument
positions in a complex main predicate for the values
derived from complements and the (equally obligatory)
governing subject (this is the ordered argument com-
ponent of the compromise), while all others are
represented as auxiliary predicates (this is the thematic
role component). Main and auxiliary predicates are
linked through one additional argument for the eventual-
ity identifier. This intermediate position corresponds
materially to Davidson’s original approach ([7 ]). Later
objections to it (also by Davidson himself), based pri-
marily on the possibility to report in a non-contradictory
manner on impossible situations ([8 ]:87 ff., [5 ]:93ff.]),
fail to convince us.
For current purposes we may suppose that there are
three participants in English, viz. Agent, Affected-
Entity, and Goal. For a sentence like 6 above, with a
prototypical bi-transitive main verb with clear comple-
ments, this might give the following set of axioms
7b) action(sk-5,give,john,sk-1,mary).
object(sk-1,apple).location(courtyard1,sk-5).
time(tuesday1,sk-5). manner(furtive,sk-5).
If, in a last step, we define sortal restrictions on the possi-
ble values that the arguments can take (e.g. +animate-
ness for Agent) and make sure that for each eventuality
there can be only one main predicate, the resulting
representation scheme amounts to a case frame represen-
tation for the central propositions of sentences with a
sound logical foundation.
In this section we move from the problem of the
required number of participants in eventualities to the
topic of their semantic characteristics. The ontological
intuition behind the use of a fixed number of argument
values is that the fillers of a given thematic role have cer-
tain semantic characteristics in common, irrespective of
what concrete predicate is used to denote the relation-
ship. If we continue to use the thematic roles most com-
monly assumed to exist, viz. Agent, Affected-Entity, and
Goal, and an appropriate predicate scheme of the follow-
ing form
action(Id,Action,Agent,Aff-Ent,Goal)
these thematic roles would allow us then to postulate
general inference rules like
∀ I1,P1,A1,E1,G1,I2,P2,E2 action(I 1,P1,A1,E1,G1) ∧
action(I 2,P2,E1,E2,G1) → ∃ I3: action(I 3,P2,A1,E2,G1)
with P1 ≠ P2, E1 ≠ E2, I1 ≠ I2 ≠ I3
that is, ‘‘If Agent A1 performs some Action P1 to
Affected Entity E1 with Goal G1, and E1, as Agent, per-
forms some other Action P2 to Affected Entity E2 with
the same Goal G1, then Agent A1 effectively himself per-
forms Action P2 to Affected Entity E2 with Goal G1’’.
It would certainly be desirable to have this kind of
completely general inference rules but there is so far very
little consensus on the uniform semantic characteristics
of different thematic roles that would make such rules
possible. Somers, at the end of an exhaustive investiga-
tion of the literature ([9 ]), came to the conclusion that it
is not possible to find a small and closed set of thematic
roles which capture all the semantically relevant infor-
mation about role fillers. He distilled off four very gen-
eral ‘‘inner roles’’, modelled (and named) after the proto-
typical processes of movement, viz. ‘‘source’’, ‘‘path’’,
‘‘goal’’, and ‘‘local’’ (± affected entity), and then defined
a number of parameters which combine with the inner
roles to give concrete participant descriptions. These
parameters correspond to very general types of eventuali-
ties, of which Somers suggested six, beginning with
straightforward movement in space and time (‘‘locative’’
and ‘‘temporal’’), over actions (with an active agent:
‘‘active’’) and processes (without an active agent:
‘‘objective’’), to immaterial changes of (psychological or
legal) eventualities (‘‘dative’’) and finally eventualities
without any agent (weather verbs etc.; ‘‘ambient’’). Con-
sequently, semantic generalisations are allowed only
within a given type of eventuality. This explanation of
the facts is very attractive from a computational perspec-
tive ([10 ]), in at least two respects.
6.  A mixed-level representation
First, inferential relationships in terms of types of
eventuality are at least as useful as completely general
inference rules operating over true deep cases. Using a
predicate scheme of the following form
Parameter(Id,Eventuality,Source,Path,Goal,Local)
we can formulate rules like
∀ I1,E1,S1,P1,G1,L1,I2,E2,P2,G2:
locative(I 1,E1,S1,P1,G1,L1) ∧
locative(I 2,E2,S1,P2,G2,L1)
→ ∃ I3,E3,P3: locative(I 3,E3,S1,P3,G2,L1)
with: E1 〉 E2 〉 E3 (non-overlapping temporal sequence)
∧ [[ E3 ]] ⊃ [[ E1 ]] ∧ [[ E3 ]] ⊃ [[ E2 ]]
Provided we know that both ‘‘roll’’ and ‘‘fall’’ are
moving-actions (parameter locative) we can now perform
the inference
Since the ball rolled from the center of the table
to its edge and fell from there to the floor
it will have moved (in an unspecified manner)
from the center of the table to the floor
Significantly, such inferences are on the right level of
granularity for the purposes of natural language under-
standing.
Second, it is now relatively easy to recognise the
‘‘inner roles’’ for a given verb phrase as we no longer
require that there must be common semantic characteris-
tics to all fillers of a given inner role, irrespective of the
type of eventuality. We can therefore apply a fairly shal-
low and straightforward mapping from grammatical
structure to inner role structure, using mainly the sub-
categorisation information for the given verb type. In
many cases, the inner roles are linguistically realised by
means of particularly obvious spatial expressions, even
when used for types of eventualities that have nothing to
do with space at all, as in ‘‘to translate from ... to’’ (prob-
ably a reflex of the historical development of language).
The mapping may be different for the various types of
eventualities but for each given type they must be the
same, or else the assignment of roles will be useless for
the purpose of inferences. In fact, this observation can be
used to inductively infer what types of eventualities
should be distinguished ([6 ]:481): Those verbs whose
role frame allows the same inferences denote the same
type of eventuality. To actually infer types of eventuali-
ties that way, presumably on the basis of corpus material,
would require a massive investment in time and resources
which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been
made. This is why we use, for the time being, a very
small subset of eventuality types (after [11 ] and [12 ]),
viz. ‘‘states’’, ‘‘processes’’ (‘‘actions’’ where the agent is
active), and ‘‘events’’ (‘‘performances’’ with an active
agent). In view of the data presented above it seems fairly
clear that a parametrised role concept is much easier to
implement than the elusive fully general ‘‘deep case’’
approach (and probably it is more useful in actual appli-
cations).
Once we have determined what roles and what eventu-
ality parameters we have to distinguish, and how syntac-
tic structures relate to them, we must decide how many
types of modifiers should be used, i.e. how many addi-
tional expressions of circumstances must be introduced.
Expressions of time and location are the most obvious
ones and manner, cause, and reason may also be uncon-
tested candidates, but what about the innumerably many
other ways to express additional information about
events and actions? Are there hard criteria telling us what
kind of modification should be dignified with its own role
predicate? The linguistic evidence strongly suggest the
appropriateness of a layered representation system:
Instead of trying to find a closed set of modifiers it seems
reasonable to claim that there is a small, finite, core set of
fairly general (and easy to recognise) modifiers, and an
outer layer of (arbitrarily specific) additional cir-
cumstance descriptions, whose number is potentially
infinite.
The set of core modifiers we use so far consists of just
purpose, method, tool, beneficiary, and manner. For all
modifiers that we cannot analyse in these terms we resort
to a lower level of abstraction and represent them in the
logic as themselves, i.e. they become non-logical con-
stants. In 10
10) On Tuesday, John gave Mary a nice computer
table against her will
we do, for instance, not know whether ‘‘computer table’’
means ‘‘table next to the computer’’, ‘‘table on which to
put a computer’’, ‘‘table designed by computer’’, or any
of a number of other possible readings, and it is equally
unclear what kinds of semantic relationships are encoded
in the prepositional phrase ‘‘against her will’’. We there-
fore turn the unanalysed preposition and the implicit
‘‘of’’ in the personal pronoun into non-logical constants,
and for the nominal compound we create an artificial
constant (by_with_for ) encoding the unanalysed rela-
tionship between its constituent parts. That way we get a
mixed-level representation, combining expressions on
three levels of abstraction:
1. Expressions of level 1: A fixed number of general,
obligatory and unique thematic role fillers
2. Expressions of level 2: A fixed number of general
but neither obligatory nor unique modifier predi-
cates
3. Expressions of level 3: An unlimited number of
arbirarily specific, optional and non-unique cir-
cumstantial descriptions
An appropriate representation of utterance 10 would
therefore be
10a) locative(give,sk-1,john,sk-3,mary).
object(table,sk-3). object(computer,sk-2).
object(will,sk-4). property(nice,sk-3).
time(sk-1,tuesday).
circumstance(by_with_for,sk-3,sk-2).
circumstance(against,sk-1,sk-4).
circumstance(of,sk-4,mary).
with expressions of level 1 at the top, followed by
expressions of levels 2 and 3. By using different levels of
semantic granularity in the knowledge representation, we
can refine our knowledge in a fully incremental fashion
• We always represent knowledge at the most general
level possible at the given point in time but allow for
arbitrarily specific entries.
• If we should later discover more general entailments
between some of these specific entries, we assert
appropriate rules, i.e. meaning postulates, found
empirically and added incrementally.
• The more information we gather, the denser the net-
work of such entailments will become, without any
need to restructure the knowledge base.
In the given application context of passage retrieval,
meaning postulates are particularly important to increase
recall. Consider a passage
11) Natural language question answering systems
where we speak about systems that perform certain
actions by means of natural language, with the logical
representation:
property(natural,sk-28)/1/11.
object(system,sk-30)/1/11.
object(language,sk-28)/1/11.
circumstance(by_with_for,sk-30,sk-28)/1/11.
object(question,sk-29)/1/11.
eventuality(answer,sk-31,sk-30,sk-29)/1/11.
But consider now the query
12) Natural language questions
which is obviously about questions phrased in natural
language. Nevertheless we would definitely want query
12 to retrieve passage 11. We can increase recall of a
retrieval system suitably by using meaning postulates
such as
circumstance(by_with_for,O1,O2)
<- eventuality(AType,Ev,Ag,O1),
circumstance(by_with_for,Ag,O2).
which will also allow us to retrieve document 11 through
query 12.
7.  Variable-Depth evaluation
Unfortunately, the use of a mixed-level representation
does not come for free. The lack of a known and fixed
level of generality must be compensated for by a large
number of meaning postulates, and these tend to get very
detailed, i.e. their branching factor is high. On top of that,
in most application contexts we will have to use inheri-
tance hierarchies. If we use meaning postulates and
inheritance relationships whenever they are applicable
we will run into insurmountable problems with the size
of the search space. We need a mechanism that controls
the search procedure suitably. This is where variable-
depth evaluation becomes useful ([13 ], [14 ]).
We can distinguish two types of criteria that may con-
trol the search procedure: External criteria (such as the
maximum number of passages to be retrieved), and inter-
nal criteria determining the resources to be used for a
given proof step. External criteria are straightforward to
implement: If a relatively shallow level of evaluation has
already produced a large number of results (e.g. relevant
passages), it is better to stop the proof at this level and
present the results to the user who might then be able to
re-phrase the original query and make it more specific.
External criteria stop the proof when it is, as it were, too
successful. Internal criteria influence the proof process
when it is not enough successful, and steer it towards
more promising branches of the search space. The single
most important internal criteria are probably the total
number of inferences allowed for the proof of a given
term, the type of the rules to be used, and the weights of
individual rules (indicating, for instance, their reliability
or general usefulness).
In LogDoc, we use a combination of external and
internal criteria. The different computational costs of
using various types of rules, and also their different use-
fulness as determined by preliminary experiments, sug-
gested the following strategy:
1. if we have found more than M passages using only
direct matches of thematic role relations, we do not
use any of the meaning postulates
2. if we have found fewer than N (N < M) passages
we begin to use meaning postulates, first those on
level 2 (defining modifiers), then those on level 3
(defining circumstantial descriptions)
3. if we have found fewer than O (O < N) passages so
far, we also try inheritance hierarchies
We found that a reasonable weighting of these values
is M:N:O = 3:2:1. The absolute threshold values used so
far are very low (M=15, N=10, O=5), due to the very
small size of the sample of documents used so far. How-
ever, we seem to get a reasonable ordering of passages.
8.  Implementation and results
LogDoc is implemented as a fully functional prototype
(on a previous version, see [15 ]). It uses a breadth-first,
bottom-up chart parser over a very small grammar of
English (represented as Definite Clause Grammar rules).
The translation into logic is performed in a
compositional, Montagovian manner, i.e. exactly follow-
ing the syntax structures. Syntactic ambiguities are
dynamically pruned on the basis of two weighted general
preference rules, the strong Principle of Right Associa-
tion and the slightly weaker Principle of Minimal Attach-
ment, modified by local syntactic and lexical semantic
criteria, each with empirically determined preference
weights, and by absolute frequencies of lexical items.
Surviving ambiguities are then filtered on the basis of the
proportional distance in preferences between ambiguous
readings, after which logically equivalent readings are
collapsed. These steps are, in the majority of cases,
sufficient to suppress all, and only, the intuitively una-
vailable readings of ambiguous constructions. Ambigui-
ties that still survive are added as disjunctive terms to the
logical data base. This required a suitable extension of
the syntax of HCL, and the proof procedure had also to
be modified correspondingly. When a phrase cannot be
analysed by the parser in its entirety, the maximal frag-
ments are translated into logic individually, and an
attempt is made to prove these logical expressions. If a
proof fails over the axioms derived from the same sen-
tence, the system incrementally relaxes proof criteria. It
first tries to prove the complete query over axioms
derived from the same document and, failing that, it gra-
dually breaks the query into ever smaller pieces, accord-
ing to the importance of different types of terms and the
links between them (links with circumstantial descrip-
tions are broken first, those between thematic role fillers
are kept longest). This makes the system remarkably
robust: Whenever a linguistic proof is impossible, Log-
Doc gradually falls back to, ultimately, the standard IR
regime.
As test documents the system uses only a few dozen
abstracts in English from the field of NLP, and the gram-
mar is also very small. It is therefore much too early to
conduct any meaningful experiments to compare the per-
formance of LogDoc with that of other systems. How-
ever, the basic principles, viz. high initial precision,
extensibility, robustness, and the use of variable-depth
inference to increase recall without loss of precision and
with acceptable run-time behaviour, can be shown to
work as designed. It is certain that considerable work will
be needed to make the system perform comparably well
for larger grammars and larger samples of text.
9.  Related work
The idea that a meaning representation language could
be used as an indexing and retrieval language is not
entirely new. There are a few systems that use a (very
limited) amount of logic for retrieval (e.g. [16 ]). How-
ever, then notion of variable depth representation is less
widespread. One system that is, on the surface, very
similar to LogDoc in the way it uses logic to encode
knowledge on different levels of generality, is SILOL by
Sembok and Rijsbergen ([17 ]). Since the semantic
import of many syntactic relationships is either ambigu-
ous or altogether unclear, Sembok and Rijsbergen intro-
duce what they call ‘‘generalised relationships’’. These
relationships should cover the common components in
such cases of ambiguity or vagueness, and therefore
correspond to the unanalysed lexical items turned into
logical constants in our system. However, Sembok and
Rijsbergen then generalise this procedure and use it for
all types of syntactic relationships, even the ones which
are straightforward to analyse. The relationship between
subjects and verbs becomes sv(X,Y) , that between sub-
ject, verb and direct object vso(X,Y,Z) etc., and all
prepositions are treated as generalised relationships in
their own right. That way the logical representation
encodes merely the syntactic structures themselves, not
even part of their meaning. But without a logical model
the whole problem of syntactic variability is back with a
vengeance. An approach that is closer to ours is that of
the system TACITUS ([18 ]). Hobbs and Stickel represent
unanalysable syntactic constructions (such as nominal
compounds) by logical predicates (e.g. nn) and add
axioms for the most common possible relations (for nom-
inal compounds, part, sample, for). However, they do not
seem to use variable-depth evaluation techniques to limit
and guide search.
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